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REGULATION OF INDUSTRIAL CORPORATIONS.
I.
A mighty power has been built up in this country in recent
years that seems to fairly stagger the methods of our government
to maintain the equal rights of all the people. Something ap-
pears to be wrong with business interests generally, and the people
are passing through a state of social unrest. The influence of
financial men has become so powerful and far reaching in qelf-
interest that doubt is expressed whether its iron grip on govern-
ment and business can ever be destroyed. This mighty power
has crippled or destroyed competition by placing a limitation in
the field of production. It fixes the prices of finished products
and raw materials and imposes its burdens upon the silent con-
suming public without restraint. The spirit of competition seems
to have almost vanished, being superseded by extortion.
In finance this .mighty power of influence is unlimited. The
association of men engaged in numerous channels of bu.-iness
regulates or controls credit. 'his power manipulates the volume
of money by inflation or contraction required for the constant
transaction of busines of the entire country. Vabulot1 profits
of business are made out of promotions and combination-. hy the
acquisition of vast areas of the public domain and rapid monop-
lization of the natural resources of timber, coal and iron. In-
dustries have been closed and business slackened in competing
localities to stifle fair competition by this mighty power in illegal
procedure of usurpation. Instead of living under the lofty prin-
ciples of a mighty Constitution where the citizen is sovereicn we
are actually living under a form of government where criminal
might is right. In transportation, after a prolonged struggle for
government control, these public service corporations have been
forced to discard their most powerful competitive weapon-the
rebate-and thus stop the old destructive competitive methods
which had been practiced by the railroads to their own and the
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public detriment. The systems of railroads were not destroyed,
but some of the evils then existing in the railroad business were
eradicated. All the wasteful, injurious methods of a score of
years ago in transportation business were worthless and vicious
competitive methods, but they have been virtually eliminated
through Federal regulatioh. These railroads are only the domes-
tic agencies of trade, and they have been regulated in a manlier
that has produced beneficial results to the shipper and consuming
publhc. So long as the regulation does not become warped the
public may continue to expect impartiality of service.
The ptblic believes that all improper trust methods or practices
may be divided into three classes, that is to say:
First: Attempted monopoly, or attempts to effectuate by agree-
ments or combinations of individuals, partnerships, or corpora-
tions, those results of monopoly for which it is condemned, viz.,
the fixing or arbitrary control of prices, or the limiting of output
below actual public needs.
Second: Methods and practices by either individuals, partner-
ships, or corporations toward competitors, of such character as
to require in the public interest, prohibition, and punishment un-
der the law of criminal conspiracy.
Third: Excessive issuance of securities by corporations, result-
ing in abnormal and improper absorption of capital for specula-
tive purposes alone and not for the purpose of increasing ef-
ficiency.
Combination is the distinctive characteristic of this commercial
era. The tendency toward combination in other directions has
passed through hardship similar to this combination of industry.
Political, religious, educational, industrial and commercial history
are similar in purpose. There is no difficulty in determining where
consolidation is harmless and where it is perilous to the general
public. The ruinous and unreasonable competition obviously
conducted for the express purpose of suppressing competition
should be prohibited from wielding tyrannical power. By a
revival of competition there is a guaranty of reasonable prices
not adduced by regulation but rather the result of economic forces
by tolerant competition. If competition proves tolerant, it should
be permitted, but if intolerant, a practical line must be drawn to
prohibit certain things which naturally involve the intolerant kind
of competition. Regardless of regulation, actual or potential.
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competition is impossible to be eradicated. Regulation would
tend to eradicate unfair competition and induce others to enter a
free field. The business man of today must continually fight
every foot of ground, or he will find by his inefficiency new indus-
tries will be established with surprising dexterity. Human nature
is aggressive to competition, and ingenuity is extraordinary to
grasp opportunities.
Iii political combinations we have seen the original thirteen
colonies combine in a single nation of prosperity, foremost among
the nations of the world. Even in Europe, dukedoms and prin-
cipalities have combined into political unions of monarchies and
kingdoms to more ably meet competitive conditions of commer-
cial prosperity. The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ire-
land. and its possessions and colonies scattered over the face of
the globe, have become affiliated in a British Empire. This
political amalgamation, or combination, is a movement toward
more liberty than is possessed by individual provinces. Those
countries and peoples who once were dire foes are now the friends
of liberty and friends of each other. Political world combina-
tion is not destructive to liberty, nor injurious to the general
welfare. This political combination, based upon a spirit of
voluntary co6peration, increases the general welfare with the in-
evitable result that this United States is a world power having
races and religions combined.
In the industrial world we have the spirit of combination which
is a world-wide movement. Labor unions have combined, and
attempted to destroy capital and private property. Then politi-
cal leaders have combined for political efficiency, religious leaders
for religious efficiency, educational leaders for educational ef-
ficiency, labor leaders for labor efficiency, and lastly we have great
combinations of commercial leaders and capital for commercial
efficiency; so that the political, religious and educational com-
binations are complete and beneficial, but the industrial and com-
mercial combinations have yet to be properly organized. The rem-
edy for our industrial and commercial ills is not its destruction and
disorganization, but rather its regulation.
II.
.Much interest is taken in the operations and propriety of hav-
ing industrial capital control and operate railroads as common
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carriers, if such controlled and operated railroads acting as com-
mon carriers are an essential part of the industrial operation.
Some railroads are common carriers in the ordinary sense of the
general term only. Other railroads are partly plant facilities
but act as common carriers for actual transportation for other
railroads, receiving a division of the rates for services rendered.
Railroads of another class are plant facilities, better known as
switching tracks, constructed exclusively for the efficient opera-
tion of the industry. By the incorporation of switching lines
under the designation of common carriers associated with the
operation of general trunk lines there appears to be hidden a
great evil which has been most difficult to detect. This owner-
ship of industrial corporations by common carriers and by indus-
trial corporations is frequently taken advantage of to defeat
equality between shippers by an unreasonable division of point
rates, forced upon the carriers by powerful shippers who control
industrial railroads. Some industrial concerns control tracks
and terminal facilities actually owned by small railroads and con-
necting carriers, which make a switching allowance, or division
of the joint rates to such terminal lines, which practice places the
industrial corporations at an advantage amounting to concessions
in the nature of rebates.
An industrial or manufacturing concern can not operate a rail-
road cheaper than a corporation exclusively engaged in transpor-
tation, but the control of the railroad by an industrial corporation
gives a decided advantage over its own lines and the lines of its
competitors. This assumption of industrial corporations to
operate and control railroads deprives the public of fair treatment
in shipping and has the effect of unjust discrimination. Like-
wise when industrial corporations obtain control of steamship
lines and docks by means of which their raw material can be trans-
ported directly to the plants of the corporation, independent com-
petition must suffer a serious hardship, all caused by the inequit-
able advantages which occur from the industrial- control and
operation of such lines for transportation. There can be no
doubt that the ownership and operation of common carriers must
result to considerable advantage when compared to other indus-
trial concerns engaged in the same line of industry who do not
own and control lines adaptable for the transportation of material
necessary for the successful operation of their plants. It is also
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perceptible that such lines are being owned and operated purposely
to obtain more than what iight be called a due proportion of thd
livision of the freight rates. Under industrial control and oper-
ation the rates for transportation are usually excessive, affording
a high per cent for returns upoh the investment. The ptiblic
has anf interest and a right, no matter what are the costs, to have
a reasonable rate for a particular service done. The measure of
rate is what the service is worth.
T'lhe making of rates is done by agreement among the railroads
to which agreements the industrial corporations are parties, and
incidentally the beneficiaries of the high rates maintained by the
controlled and operated lines. When tew rates are contem-
plated, the industrial corporations are generally represented at
the conferences and the rates are made as high as the traffic will
bear, which always proves profitable by the favorable division of
the.rates, An unreasonable and highly profitable charge is made
itpol raw material by comnon carriers to the extent that the in-
dustrial corporations are indirectly benefited by' reason of te
ownership of the lines when they transport thei r own materials to
their own plants and when they transport freight to the connecting
carrier for shipment. Again, the rates for transportation by
steamship lines and the service of dock companies yield profits
that are not only excessive but grossly out of all proportion to the
actual cost of conducting the business fofa fair return upon the
value of the property utilized The benefits dite to the owner-
ship and operation of these transportatiofl lines art clearly repre-
sented in the earnings of the corporations and can easily be traced
through their authentic annual reports showing all their expenses
and revenues until they finally reach the balance of profits and de-
clared rate of dividefid. In some instances the returns or profits
for carriage have been most exorbitant, 'ranging from 40 to
nearly 400 per cent. Under a lease control the industrial cor-
poration receives the entire proceeds, excepting'the small rate of
interest payable on the shares held by the sto(kholders of the
leasing corporation, and" frequently the rate of interest on the
shares of stock is stipulated in the terms of th lease sufficiently
low to guarantee a high per ceit of income to the lessee. As
illustrating this feature of mari'ilation reference may be made
to the Bessemer & Lak Erie Railroad Company, which owns 8.87
miles of railroad, a line which Was constructedt6 "shorten an angle
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in the Pittsburg, Bessemer & Lake Erie Railroad, containing
213.41 miles of track, and controlled under lease by the Bessemer
& Lake Erie Company, capitalized at $500,000.
The report of the Bessemer & Lake Erie Railroad shows a
capital stock of $5oo,ooo; a net corporate income for the year
ended June 30, 1912, of $1,936,8o4, or 387.36 per cent on the
capital stock; dividends declared from the surplus were 250 per
cent; balance credit Profit and Loss, June 30, 1912 (undistributed
surplus), $2,413,6oi, or 482.72 per cent. The Duluth, Missabe
& Northern Railway Company has a capital stock of $4,112,500,
.and a net corporate income for the year ended June 30, 1912, of
$2,766,o6i, or 67.26 per cent; dividends declared from the sur-
plus at ioo per cent; balance credit Profit and Loss, June 30,
1912 (undistributed surplus), $4,581,017, or 111.39 per cent.
The Duluth & Iron Range Railroad has a capital stock of $3,000,-
ooo; net corporate income for the year erided June 30, 1912,
$2,578,232, or 85.93 per cent: dividends declared from surplus
were 90 per cent; balance credit Profit and Loss, June 30, 1912
(undivided surplus), $2,216,391, or 73.88 per cent.
Allowances out of the rates on all shipments outbound and
inbound from the plant., in some instances amount to a very sub-
stantial part of the rate. Rate divisions on thle raw materials
are often far in excess of what Federal investigation has said is
a fair compensation, and much greater than the proportion of
rate received by railroad owned terminals for a similar and iden-
tical service. "Devices and practices are instituted which may
not all be strictly in violation of the Act to Regulate Commerce;
nevertheless, they result in unfair advantages to' the independent
industrial corporation. Records of terminal lines owned by in-
dustrial corporations show that the business transportation is
mostly the carriage for the industrial corporations owning them,
whereby an immense revenue is derived for the handling of their
own freight. This gives an income out of all proportion to the
cost of service, being regulated by agreement for the division of
the rates. Terminal allowances are arbitrary sums, usually so
much per ton, or car, paid to the railroad handling the freight at
the point to which it was originally consigned. The switches,
connection and rolling stock are incorporated as a common car-
rier and used entirely for the transportation of their own freight.
Such" switching railroads are aptly called plant facilities by reason
of their flinction to facilitate the delivery oi assembling of raw
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materials to the plants operating them. These switching road-
connect with large trunk lines and the shipper, having the routing
of immense tonnage, meaning vast sums of money to the carriers,
can by means of the routing device play one road against the
other, and thereby obtain an inequitable division of the joint rates,
(which are in effect purely rebates and excessive allowances per
ton, or car,) in such amounts as to render the corporations re-
sponsible for the advantage over the other industries which have
no such devices for the evasion of the law, or for preventing the
unjust discrimination in making freight rates.
The officials of large trunk lines are not willing parties to these-
devices, but they are either induced by self-interest or compelle(
by the fear of loss of traffic to concede advantages to industriar
corporations that are the originators of tremendous tonnage of
freight. Railroads, both large and small, seek these favors andi
will gladly turn switching and transfer business to the industrial!
corporations in the hope of receiving the transportation business.
in return. By the power to route shipments of their own freight
over their connecting lines they are able to dictate the division of'
the rates to the trunk lines making the long haul. Such practices
have been endured by the privately owned railroads in the control
of the blood-fed monopolies. Nearly all the great trunk lines
have been interested in industries where freight was a large ele-
ment in the cost of marketing a great bulky product. Wherever
the industrial corporation is both the shipper and the carrier, the-
higher the rate the greater its profits; and since freight rates are
never established, but actually arranged by the conferences be-
tween all the railroads in a given territory, the representatives of
the railroads owned by the industrial corporations will alway.-
wield their moral influence and vote in favor of the highest rate
obtainable, which always means a rate just as high as the traffic-
will bear. Investigation has shown that the policy of the United
States Steel Corporation in the matter of freight rates has beeir
to insist upon a rate just as high as it can be, if the railroads will
give some definite rebate, or preference in some other way; mean-
ing that the return for the favors should be a large proportion of
the division of the rates for freight routed over the large trunk
lines. The tendency of the railroads to favor these industriaf
corporations becomes manifest when we realize that the railroads
purchase about 4o per cent of all the steel manufactured in the
United States; and it is not in human nature that directors of
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an industrial corporation like the United States Steel Corpora-
tion, selling its millions of dollars' worth of steel in the way of
structural steel, rails, etc., to themselves as directors of the rail-
roads, should do otherwise than favor their own corporation. Un-
der these circumstances it is not surprising that the price of steel
rails exclusively consumed by railroads should remain fixed for
a period of ten years at the arbitrary price of $28 a ton.
The evil effect of the control and operation of common carriers
by industrial corporations cannot be denied. Complaint has
been made to the Interstate Commerce Commision by parties en-
gaged in the shipping of independent products. The commission
has justly complained of the great difficulty in solving these intri-
cate questions and permitting the continued injustice which arises
from the cunning manipulation of terminal allowance and the
division of the joint rates. Neither is the evil cured by the de-
cisions under the "commodity clause" of the Act to Regulate
Commerce, although the legislators aimed directly at this evil sys-
tem of allied transportation by declaring that "it shall be unlawful
for any railroad to transport in interstate commerce * * * any
article, or commodity, other than timber and manufactured prod-
ucts thereof, wherein it has an interest direct or indirect." The
commodity clause was held valid by the Supreme Court in the
case of the United States v. Delaware & Hudson Company. 213
U. S., 366. As the Court construed the clause, however, the
bona fide ownership by a carrier of stock in a producing company
does not constitute a direct or indirect legal interest in the car-
rier in the commodity manufactured, mined or produced within
the meaning of the act. (Justice Harlan dissenting.) In this case
it was also decided that a company organized as a canal company
and only operating a railroad as an incident to mining, was sub-
ject to the act as to its interstate commerce. It is perhaps a fair
inference from these cases that while a railroad company may
own stock in a mining company, it can not use such ownership for
the control of such subsidiary company without falling within the
prohibition of the act. The result is that the commodity clause
is aimed at only one feature of the proposition, when in fact it
should have double significance and application not only to pro-
hibit railroads from owning industrial corporations engaging in
interstate commerce, but likewise to prohibit industrial corpora-
tions from owning and operating railroads.
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By investigation it has been ascertained that the power and
profits of the United States Steel Corporation rest in its owner-
ship and operation of common carriers. The recent investiga-
tion by Congress of the United States Steel Corporation shows
that the actual cost of production of the Steel Corporation and
of other large independent concerns is nearly the same; yet the
profits of the Steel Corporation infinitely exceed those of its com-
petitors. No doubt the difference between these profits is in the
main obtained by advantageous freight rates for transportation.
This, in fact, was admitted by Judge Gary before the Committee
when he expressed the opinion that the Steel Corporation could
cut down prices sufficiently to drive many of their competitors out
of the business. This is so not entirely because of its hold on the
market, but because of its ability to produce more cheaply and
because of its ownership in the independent concerns, such
as the railroads, the steamship lines and dock facilities,
which give a large credit from the United States Steel Corpora-
tion's standpoint ; showing that transportation lines, in Mr. Gary's
opinion, are the important factors, and if the Steel Corporation
chose to do it, with its present weapons it could actually destroy
its competitors. So as long as great industrial corporations are
permitted to organize a system of switches, located entirely on
their property, into a corporation on equality with common car-
riers, these abuses arising from the division of joint rates and
terminal allowances to actual plant facilities can never be ade-
quately relieved. An industrial corporation transporting its
freight -for a few miles over its own lines by means of its own
facilities .lhould be required to place its freight into the course of
commerce on an equality with that of an ordinary shipper
tendering a single car of similar material for shipment. If there
is any special reason why an industrial corporation should control
a railroad, the benefit which comes to the industry by reason of
such economy will be sufficient without making it allowances for
terminal services, or divisions of joint rates with the regular com-
mon carriers.
It is apparent.that the opinion of Congress, when debating on
the Hepburn bill for the prevention of discriminations, which is
the very 'essence of the. Act to Regulate Commerce, was that
sound public policy demands the divorce of production, man-
ufacture and ownership of property from transportation of that
property. Also when the commodity clause was discussed.
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Senator Elkins said that the purpose of this amendment was to
make a start towards divorcing production ftom transportation.
Both in the Senate and in the House the debate conclusively
showed that .Congress had-in mind that these evils existed from
the excessive allowances made to the transportation lines by in-
dustrial operations, and that this undue discrimination could
only be avoided by a complete divorce of the ownership, or pro-
duction, from the transportation of property.
The debate on the Hepburn bill throughout, both in the House
and in the Senate, shows conclusively that it was in the mind of
Congress that great evils existed from the allowance to shippers
of excessive amounts for transportation facilities furnished by
them, and that undue discrimination could only be avoided by the
complete divorce of the ownership, or production, from the
transportation of property. We shall cite only a few instances
which we think establish conclusively the fact that in the opinion
of Congress ownership, or production, should be divorced from
transportation,
0n January 31, 19o6, Representative Campbell, of Kansas, said
(Congressional Record, Vol. 40, Part 2, p. 1S28) :
"'The irresistible result and the logical effect of conceding to
large shippers the right to use their own facilities is the creation of
monopoly, which is always dangerous to the public welfare."
And on February 2, 19o6, MIr. Goulden said (40 Congressional
Record, Part 2, p. 1961) :
"The bill that passed last Congress. and against which I had
the honor of casting mly vote, was exceedinglV objectionable. The
provision creating a special court with its heavy expenses, the
failure to reach the private-car and terminal-Oharge evils, caused
the Senate to refuse last year to consider the action of this body.
The thousands of private cars of the meat, fruit and other trusts
dictated terms to the railroads and compelled compliance with
their demands."
And on February 7, 19o6, Representative Wiley, of Alabama,
repeated what he had said a year previously (Congressional
Record, Vol. 40, p. 2241) :
"There are numerous business concerns in all sections- of the
country having several miles of private side tracks, switching priv-
ileges and terminal facilities. These accommodations, by what-
ever name called, enable the owners to secure special rates, which
are but a stfuterfuge, device or scheme to cover up and hide from
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the eyes of the public unjust rebates. They obtain a division of
freight on all cars delivered to connecting roads by means of their
private terminals, and receive compensation for service rendered
which is unfair and excessive. These abuses can not be rectified
until these terminal companies are placed under the control of
the Interstate Commerce Commission."
On May 7, i906, Senator Bailey said (Congressional Record
Vol. 40, Part 7, p. 6460):
"I had supposed that this is one correction upon which all Sena-
tors would agree, because I have not during this prolonged dis-
cussion heard any Senator express any opposition to the divorce-
between the business of- a common carrier and the business of a
miner, manufacturer or a producer."
And on May 8, 19o6, Senator Aldridge said (Congressional
Record, Vol. 40, Part 7, p. 6507):
"Mr. President, I think there is a practical agreement in the
Senate that the business of transportation by interstate carriers
ought to be divorced from the business of production by the same
carriers."
On March 13, 19o6, Senator Simmons said (Congressional
Record, Vol. 40, Part 4, P. 3727) :
"It is a well-known fact that within this time certain combina-
tions have monopolized many of the prime commodities of indus-
try and commerce, and, through the enormous volume of business
they can give or withhold, aided by the devices of private switches,
cars, refrigeration, ventilation and icing, have for .some time past
compelled, and today in many instances compel the railroads to
accept such compensation as they are willing to pay for the trans-
portation of commodities in which they deal or for the traffic
which they control."
As an administrative body, the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion can not stop at the surface of a transportation problem be-
cause its form and outward appearance are regular, but must
reach the actual situation and examine its real substance, and thus
be able to enforce the prohibitions as well as the requirements of
the act. The commission has said that the controlling inquiry
should be, not the character of the servant which renders the ser-
vice, but the character of the service rendered:-17 I. C. R., 514-
When a plant facility performs a service clearly confined to the
processes of manufacture, conversion and production, no one
would contend that a carrier could legally assume any part of the
REGUL.-1TIO OF CORPORATIONS
expense of such service; but a plant facility service may in some
cases have many of the physical incidents of a transportation ser-
vice, and it is in connection with such cases that the difficulty, if
there be any difficulty, arises. Unless a railroad is legally found
to perform the service for which it proposes to make these allow-
ances, the allowances can not lawfully be made by it, and the
Commission has directly held that a railroad is not found to per-
form such services :-14 I. C. R., 237; 20 I. C. R., 200.
IJr.
Twenty-two years ago, Congress passed the Sherman Anti-trust
Law, forbidding combination in restraint of trade. During this
period the great industrial combinations, as the Sugar Trust, Beef
Trust, Coal Trust, Steel Trust, Tobacco Trust, Oil Trust, Shoe
-Making Trust, Harvester Trust and Lumber Trust, have all devel-
oped and prospered and also depressed business and oppressed the
public. There have been seven prosecutions for violation of the
Anti-trust Law under the Harrison Administration, eight under
the Cleveland Administration, three under the 'McKinley Admin-
istration, forty-four under the Roosevelt Administration, and
nearly fifty under the Taft Administration. In a number of
these suits, the decisions of the Courts have been in favor of the
(;overnment'in this period of prosecution; notably so in four
cases-the Northern Securities case, the Standard Oil case, the
Tobacco case and the Union Pacific Merger case. with the Steel
case and others pending. Mr. Taft has done more in four years
than all the other Presidents combined, in office during the life
of the Sherman Law. The defining of the rule of reason in the
()il and Tobacco decisions was first looked upon as a step back-
wards, but recent decisions and the adjustment of trade condi-
tions thereto have about demonstrated tout ait contraire.
The following passage in President Taft's message to Congress
just prior to its adjournment for the holidays is worthy of es-
pecial consideration:
"A trade commission which looks to the fixing of prices is im-
practical and ought not for a moment to be considered as a pos-
sible solution. The enforcement of the Sherman Anti-trust Law
is gradually solving itself, is maintaining the principle and restor-
ing the practice of competition; and if the law is quietly but firmly
enforced business will adjust itself to the statutory requirement
and then the unrest in commercial circles provoked by the trust
discussion will disappear."
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The Sherman Law had been believed by many to be vague and
indefinite to such a degree that even the Courts could be led
astray easily as to its exact meaning in its application to matters
before them. Has the result of vigorous attempts to destroy
commercial competition been a failure, not less absolute, though
not confessed? By the Sherman Anti-trust Law, the successful
prosecution as criminals of men engaged in the attempt by crimi-
nal and barbaric methods to destroy competitors has been made
possible. It has proved that great combinations are not above
the law, and their crimes can be brought to light and repetitions
rendered impossible in the future. Transportation has been reg-
ulated and improved in quality, but the powers have not been
fully employed. There must be a supervision of corporations
by the Government. The over-valuation of properties and over-
issue of stocks and bonds must be prohibited. Labor conditions
must be under control of the State Law.
The effect of the Sherman Law may be seen in the recent opin-
ion of the Supreme Court holding the Pacific merger illegal.
Herein the combination was declared to be a violation of the
Anti-trust Act, all brought about by the acquisition of stock
shares designed to manipulate sufficient control of the Southern
Pacific by the Union Pacific to effect a consolidation of the twa
companies, and thereby stifle competition among common carriers
and dominate interstate traffic. Concerning this merger the
Court said: "In order to effectually conclude the operating force
of the combination such disposition should be made subject to the
approval and decree of the Court, and any plan for the disposi-
tion of this stock must be such as to effectually dissolve the un-
lawful combination thus created. The Court shall proceed, upon
the presentation of any plan, to hear the Government and defend-
ants, and may bring in any additional parties whose presence may
be necessary to a final disposition of the stock in conformity to
the views herein expressed."
The tendency of the Supreme Court to tighten the interpreta-
tion of the Sherman Anti-trust Act was manifested recently by the
disapproval of the plan, or scheme, proposed by the Union Pacific
Railroad attorneys for "dissolving" the Union Pacific-Southern
Pacific Railroad merger by allowing the Union Pacific stock-
holders to have the exclusive privilege of buying the Southern
Pacific stock now owned by the Union Pacific Corporation. The
Union Pacific attorneys claimed for the stockholders this ex-
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clusive privilege of taking over the, $25,000,000 worth of
Southern Pacific stock, "in order that they may have an oppor-
tunity to protect themselves against the sacrifice of this valuable
asset covered by investment." The attorneys claimed that the
so-called controlling interest in the Union Pacific held only 13
per cent of the stock of the Union Pacific, and, therefore, would
be able to buy only 6 per cent of the total capitalization of the
Southern Pacific Company. This may be as they claim, but it
is evident that Supreme Court are becoming very alert concerning
"paper" dissolutions, and the decision is regarded as a highly
important precedent in anti-trust legislation. The Court took
the position that a corporation is only another name for the stock-
holders, and to allow the Union Pacific stockholders to buy the
stock now held by the Union Pacific Railroad Company, the cor-
poration of which they are stockholders, would amount to noth-
ing effectual.
"In rejecting the proposal," said Justice Day, "for the transfer
of the Southern Pacific Company's stock held for the Union
Pacific Company, either by distribution among, or sale to, the
stockholders of the Union Pacific Company, we do not mean to
preclude the District Court from considering and acting upon the
plans which may be submitted to it under the former opinion and
decree of the Court. We are of the opinion, however, and now
hold that the proposed plan of disposition of the entire stock
holding of the Union Pacific Company in the Southern Pacific
Company by transfer will not so effectually end the combination
as to comply with the decree heretofore ordered to be entered by
the Court."
Plans for the disp osition of the shares of stock proposed by
the railroad officials have all been discarded by the Attorney-
General as inconsistent with the demands of the Court decree.
This action reveals the determination of the Government to view-
very critically and make effectual the plans for separation of in-
terests into their integral parts. Surely this decree was one of the
most far-reaching opinions ever rendered by the Supreme Court,
and henceforth the results of decrees for dissolution of monopo-
lies existing in violation of the Sherman Anti-trust Act will be
made more complete, and inter-corporate directorates will be con-
clusively prohibited. There has been no regulation by way of
amendment to the Sherman Anti-trust Act of July, 189
o , although
many eminent men have said that it should have been repealed
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in toto. Eminent men doubted the justice and soundness of the
decisions in the Standard Oil and Tobacco cases, but probably
since the later decisions those who doubted the majesty of the
law are more convinced that the Courts are able to control and
break up the goaded monopolies and put an end to the existence
of corporations which are chartered by the States, and which
have shown themselves harmful to the public. It has demon-
strated and established the power of the Government over cor-
porations and combinations organized with unlimited power by
State authority. Vith these decisions against monopoly the
Federal power is defined, without which subsequent regulation
could not be made effective by passing more laws until the Gov-
ernment had demonstrated its power to enforce those laws pre-
viously enacted. These decisions have ended numerous unfair
methods designed to crush and destroy competition: the holding
company was severed; the subsidiary companies were separated
and prohibited to be managed as a harmonious unit; publicity
of corporate affairs, which appears to be the greatest protection
against aggregated corporate abuse and oppression, was enforced.
There are now 270,000 corporations in the United States whose
income is in excess of $5,ooo annually, subject to the Corporate
Tax Law. These hae an aggregate capital stock of fifty-seven
billion dollars, bonded indebtedness of thirty-two billions and an
aggregate net income of three and one-half billion dollars. The
enormity of controlling interests may be conceived by the result
disclosed by the congressional investigation that eighteen cor-
porations whose interlocking of directors gives them domination
of the financial field are so inter-related to each other that an
exact estimate of their dependence is hard to make. The "capital-
ization" attributed by the committee's experts to each of these
eighteen firms refers to the total capital stock and funded debts
of the various corporations "interlocked" with the financial insti-
tution. The $25,325,000,000 total of control fixed by the experts
represents the total of control exercised by all of the eighteen
firms acting together.
These eighteen firms have only i8o members, who hold direc-
torships in 124 of the wealthiest corporations of the nation. The
statistics showed that those 18o men have 385 directorships in
41 great banks and trust companies, with aggregate resources
of $3,832,000,000; 50 directorships in ii giant insurance com-
panies with assets of $2,646,000,000; 155 directorships in 31 great
REGULATION OF CORPORATIONS
railroad systems capitalized at $12,I93,ooo,ooo; six directorships
in two express companies and four directorships in one steamship
company with a combined capital of $245,ooo,ooo and a gross
income of $97,0o0,ooo; 98 directorships in 28 industrial corpora-
tions capitalized at $3,583,ooo,ooo and earning over $1,145,000,-
ooo annually; and 48 directorships in 19 public utility corpora-
tions capitalized at $2,826,ooo,ooo, and earning over $428,ooo,ooo
annually. Transportation companies in whose board of direc-
tors Morgan representatives sit, were said to be: International
Mlercantile Marine Company ; Adams Express Company; Atchison,
Topeka & Sante Fe; Chicago Great Western; Erie; Lehigh Val-
ley; New York Central; New York, New Haven & Hartford;
Northern Pacific; Pere Marquette; Reading; and Southern.
The investigation of the Steel Corporation by the House Com-
mittee disclosed-most astounding facts and conclusively showed
that the United States Steel Corporation was purposely organized
under the liberal corporation laws of the State of New Jersey as
a holding corporation in character designed to monopolize the
steel industry of the country. It was incorporated in April,
i9oi, with about $i,4oo,ooo,ooo of capital, of which approxi-
mately $6oo,ooo,ooo to $700,00o,ooo was water, being greatly
over-capitalized. This, however, has been remedied to a great de-
gree by extensive investments of earnings since its organization.
The objects aimed at by the organization were: greater integra-
tion and the consequent increased economy and efficiency in
operation and the avoidance of paying profits to outsiders; pro-
motion and stock market profits; and lessening of severe competi-
tion in business. The earnings of the Steel Corporation for the
decade from I9OI to 1911 averaged about, 12 per cent annually on
the actual value of the property. The output for i9oI was
about 42 per cent of the total output of pig iron in the United
States, and in i9io about 43 per cent. In i9oi the Steel Cor-
poration produced about 6o per cent of all the crude and finished
product of the United States. By 1911 its percentage of the
product dropped to 50 per cent.
The directors of the United States Steel Corporation are men
of wealth, having great business ability and large interests, which
command fabulous wealth sufficient to dominate financial and
industrial and transportation affairs. Their experience and
ability have been largely utilized by the companies with which they
are connected. They are nearly all directors in other companies
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than the United States Steel Corporation. These companies are
of various kinds and include railroads, banks, and manufacturing
companies. No evidence was given or offered tending to show
that the fact of such relations, on the part of the directors of the
United States Steel Corporation, had ever been used or at-
tempted to be used to the injury of competitors, to obtain any
unfair advantage for the United States Steel Corporation, or to
the detriment of the general public. Il every instance the direc-
tors of the United States Steel Corporation constitute only a very
small minority of the directors of the other companies with which
they are connected. Such relations, however, give opportunity
for abuses and agreements in restraint of trade.
The system of interlocking directorates employed had insidious
consequences which no man can gauge. Yet that evil is not so
great today as it was five years since. "Inside management" is
a term used to express a certain reprehensible practice which a
few years ago was all too prevalent in the business world. When,
in administering the affairs of any corporation, the directors pur-
sue a policy more favorable to their own financial interests than
to those of the corporation which they are chosen to represent-
to characterize such practices men use the expression, "inside
management."
Interlocking directorates facilitate "inside management." In-
terlocking directorates often have been used for the purpose of
stifling competition. Yet in many communities it is a distinct
advantage not to limit the sphere of usefulness of any business
man. Interlocking directorates, like so many other human agen-
cies, are fit subjects for regulation rather than for destruction,
and doubt is expressed as to absolute prohibition, unless regu-
lation shall fail to abate the evil.
In some instances stocks were not "watered" in the ordinary
acceptance of the term; they were literally deluged. The cost
of constructing or reproducing the several plants constituting the
combine was inconsequential as compared with the value of this
new device for enjoying with immunity an old and hitherto for-
bidden privilege-an absolute monopoly in a valuable and neces-
sary article of commerce. It had, at the beginning, secured the
consolidation of a great number of steel and iron works, big and
little, modern and antiquated, not only with a view to scientific
and economical co-ordination of plants and processes, but to the
curtailing of production and fixing prices. These mines, mills,
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and furnaces, thrown together in a hurried a14 haphazard rqan-
ner, had been capitalized at approximately 300 per cent qf their
actual Value, and weighted and trammeled by this burden of ex-
cessive capitalization, they were ronfessedly unable to meet im-
pending competition from one single concern, until recently a
limited partnership, which had avoided the evils of the stock ex-
change and the control of the syndicate.
The extent to which fictitious Values have been created by over-
capitalization of corpqrate property has shakeii pi.hblic copfidence
in corporate securities and made the publiQ mind distrustful of
large business enter rises. This policy has chegted both the in-
vestor and the consumer. The investqr has pqrchased stock
under the mistaken belief that the face had some relation to the
value. Th ,conspmer of corporate produtrs has cope tq fee qnid
jyith much justification, that he has been maade to pay exorbitapt
prqfits to pver-capitalized corporations that they might pay divi-
dend$ on fictitious §tock values. The failure to pay dividends
meant a deprfs§sion of its stock and a d.turbance of the stock
piarket, and the interests in control had q greater interest in an d
derived a greater profit from their operations in the stock market
than frqp the arppfacture of steel.
Undoubtedly the question wyhich mqt deeply interests- the
American pepIple, in regard to the United States $t~el Cqrpora:
tion, is what effect it has had uppo the pices of iron and steel
products which are furnished to the people of the IJnited $tates.
f it ha. had the effect, either through inpfficiency or otherwise,
pf increasing the cost to the public of the kind of prpducts it manu-
frctures, it is to he condemned upon economic groqnds. If it
ha produed ! ,h an effect through illegaJ ,cpmbinatipps, it is tQ
be f rther codemned as a violator qf the law. Of 'yourse no
one pan bp certain what the prices of stee! prodtucts lptld have
bepp if the Unijte States Ste Corporption'had not been organ-
ized, and therefore no one can prove with ahsqlpte cprtainty that
th, Upited States Steel corporation has loweved prices beyond
what they would have been if it had not been organized; but, on
the other hand, those who seek to show that it has a tendency to
increase prices will find little consolation in the, facts ascertained
by the committee. It is undoubtedly true that the corporation
has a steadying effect upon prices and prevented wide fluctua-
tions. The tendency of prices has been downward, and prices
are probably lower than they would have been had the company
never existed.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
It has been said by notable gentlemen before the Senate
Committee of Interstate Commerce that the present Anti-trust
Act should remain in the statute books unaltered and unchanged;
that an attempt to define by statute the phraseology of the act
would not be a step in the right direction. It would lead to
greater uncertainty and lead to a great deal of litigation. Con-
gress should defer any modification of the language of the act
until we have had some further decisions by the Supreme Court
showing that the results desired by Congress will not be attained
under the present law. Public interest would be best promoted
if at the present session of Congress some legislation should be
undertaken in the regulation of Industrial Interstate Commerce.
A question arises in the probable event of legislation if any
change could be made in the Sherman Law that would improve it
materially, considering the twenty-two years of experience.
IV.
It is wiser to keep the administration of laws in the hqnds of
qur executive officer whom Congress should hold responsible, and
who, with his corps of assistants, can act instantly to meet all
emergencies and contingencies, and in no instance should there be
a divided council. There is nothing inherent in the organization,
in the form of the organization of the Department of Justice that
should impede the proper and thorough enforcement of laws.
The progress is sometimes clogged by influence, as it sometimes
happens in our large cities like New York and Chicago, that the
laws against gambling and other forms of vice and criminality
are not so well enforced as they should be, because of the in-
fluence of the organized power of money. The power of millions
and billions often finds it possible to hobble the enforcement of
law and impede the administration of justice. These combina-
tions aiming to restrict the administration of justice, naturally
hobble everything for a degree of time, although it is inevitable
that their power would soon be reduced to a fraction if brave
and fearless Government officials would exercise exhaustive re-
sources to enforce the law against this terrible and menacing op-
pression. The law against smuggling is thoroughly enforced by
the Department of Justice, also the law against counterfeiting
and illicit distilling. The Department of Justice is not weak in
organization, but it needs further encouragement and support.
If these officers should fail in their duty against revengeful trusts,
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they should be relieved of duty, and courageous men put in their
places, who, fearless of monopolistic power when armed with the
law, would know nothing but tireless prosecution.
There is a fraction of truth that the great trusts and monopo-
lies in this great country today originated largely through favor-
itism in the way of rebates, and rates, and special privileges, ex-
tended to them by the private corporations which controlled the
railroads. If there are any great trusts or aggregations of
capital receiving any special favors to enable them to crush out
competition and control the market, the present laws do not pro-
vide a proper remedy for the evil; but if there are sufficient and
adequate remedies for the evil, some reason must exist for ineffec-
tive laws. One reason seems clear, and that is that the Govern-
ment fails through the executive branch to properly enforce the
law. The great mass of the people today believes that the princi-
pal difficulty, the principal evil suffered from these great aggre-
gations of capital known as trusts, arises from their ability to
defy the law and escape its provisions and penalties. A popular
remedy might be a change of fine to a cruel Draconion law, to
punish the men who violate the Sherman Anti-trust Law by pro-
viding not less than two years nor more than ten years in the peni-
tentiary for these officers. Apparently these officers of trusts are
well known, because they can not be hidden from the public eye,
and it is visible to every one that much indignation has been
aroused by the wholesale defiance of the law and neglect of the
executive officers of the Government to properly punish or proceed
against those violators.
Every citizen has felt the hand of oppression from. the opera-
tion of the Beef Trust, the Oil Trust, the Steel Trust, the Tobacco
Trust, and others of that character. In the face of prosecu-
tions, the people are subjected to excessive prices unexplainable.
President Taft, in his Chicago speech, said that the business men
complained that they were unable to understand just when they
were violating and when they were not violating the Anti-trust
Act. The belief is that such business men who protest are ex-
tremely innocent, or intentionally deceptive, because the President
doubted the soundness of their contention; and that any jury
could tell in two minutes whether a man intended to establish a
monopoly, or a corporation. Very few of these business men
have been brought before a jury to try whether they are
guilty or innocent, and when there was a late attempt to bring
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them before a jury they were so sure of their innocence that they
resorted to the extraordinary proceedings of habeas corpus to
avoid facing the jury. Should not the criminal provision of the
law be fully enforced against them? .But it seems that during
the last twenty-two years the civil provisions are far too drastic
without going to the criminal provision that the attorney-general
has been afraid to invoke against them. Just why this is a fact
no doubt the general public would be much pleased to learn from
the Department of Justice itself,--why it is afraid to invoke a
provision inserted in the civil clause of the law from fear of which
the giant, seasoned, rhinoceros-hided corporations, like the Stand-
ard Oil and the Tobacco Trusts, become tender.
The primary purpose of legislation, whether State or Federal,
is, first, to restore to the individual citizen, or the smaller aggrega-
tions of actual capital, an opportunity to engage successfully in
commercial business, and second, to reduce for the consumer the
exorbitant price of commodities produced by the present com-
binations or cognomened trusts. Under present conditions, it is
impossible for an individual to engage in business, or a corpora-
tion established in business to know whether it is violating the
Anti-trust Law until it has been proceeded against by the Federal
Government. No doubt agreements can be entered into clearly in
restraint of trade and in violation of the Sherman Anti-trust Law,
but it is impossible to actually know, by virtue of its size and char-
acter of its business, whether or not a corporation is violating the
law until Federal prosecution is begun, because it would be largely
a matter of opinion and judgment as to its actual status. There
is not a definite rule to determine what per cent of the manufac-
tured product makes such corporation a trust under the law.
Resort to the Courts is necessary now to overcome restraints of
trade, but many are of the opinion that some remedy should be
devised which should be self-executing, of an administrative na-
ture in.contradistinction to legal procedure, which is unsatisfac-
tory to Governments. A corporation receives a privilege from
the State Government to capitalize its business. The right to
associate capital under one control is a valuable right, and the
Government apparently has a right to demand something in return
for the corporate privilege extended.
It will at length come to be generally understood that inter-
state commerce is not static, but active; not a condition, but a
movement. There is a wide difference in fact, but none in law,
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between the man who engages in a few small interstate transac-
tions each year and the corporation engaging to the extent of
hundreds of millions a year. There is a doctrine which has been
adopted by the Courts to reconcile the difficulties of having two
forms of law,-laws made by the State and laws made by the
United States,-which doctrine says that the States shall have the
power where they have no purpose of regulating interstate trade,
but intend to carry out some legal purpose that is proper and
within their jurisdiction, of passing laws even though they may
have a direct or remote or unintended effect on interstate or for-
eign commerce. Both the States and the United States are to
some extent engaging in interstate commerce. But that is not the
fact with which the Federal Government is concerned in regulating
interstate commerce. Congress may punish, enjoin, and other-
wise deal with individuals, through Court process, as an incident
to the regulation of commerce. But that all pertains to the
remedial or administrative branch of its power, and is referable to
another provision of the Constitution. Primarily, the power to
regulate the conduct of individuals and corporations is in the
States, and pertains to the police power. Legal procedure may
amend one evil by prosecution, if forcefully applied, against the
trusts or combinations in the form of the monopoly. Also where
the wrong is perpetrated should be the place of trial, just as
in the prosecution of crimes. When States made corpora-
tions a vital power to act and conduct business as persons, then
the evil began to develop with alarming rapidity. Although lim-
ited in capacity for a time, they later combined and extended their
operations into other States, and then problems developed with
endless complications. They could not be held within the bounds of
their corporate charters from which they gradually broke and thus
placed themselves in the domain of the Federal Government, in-
viting Federal regulation. How to prevent oppression; how to
fix liability; how to insure honest management; how to prevent
hurtful over-capitalization; how to prevent aggregations hurtful
to commerce; and how to separate the carrier from the manufac-
turer, have all become questions for solution by the National Gov-
ernment. All are objects of interstate commerce and subject to
regulation under the Constitution. The Constitution is not a
command of. divine origin, everlasting and unchangeable, nor is
it a code of laws, but rather a declaration of principles intended to
be applied to the changing conditions of the growth of the nation
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and society in general. A liberal construction of the Constitu-
tion has been maintained by the Courts of the country for a su-
prenmacy of national power, first instituted by Justice Marshall,
who gave the Constitution its most progressive and elastic con-
struction. The power of the National Government to control
corporations engaged in interstate commerce by a system of
licenses or incorporation acts is fully sustained by the opinion of
the great Chief Justice. All authorities agree that Congress has
plenary power to provide regulations under which it can permit
corporations organized under the laws of the various States to en-
gage in interstate commerce. The National Government may cor-
rect the very evils which the unlimited corporation laws of many
of the States permit. The National Government may regulate
the amount of capital; may regulate stockholding in other corpora-
tions; may regulate all attempts to monopolize; and may regulate
any unfair methods of competition. Also the National Govern-
ment may prevent these corporations from engaging in interstate
commerce if they violate the regulations enacted.
This is an age of centralization, which no broad-thinking man
can doubt. By improved means of transportation and communi-
cation this country is a unit which was wholly inconceivable at
the time the Government was founded. State lines have van-
ished. in commerce and transportation affairs. Surely it is idle
legislation to attempt to resist these unifying influences which
dominate and operate in every section. We must have concen-
tration and co6peration in Government regulation for commercial
advancement. Concentration and co6peration are conditions
imperatively essential for modern industrial advance. The peo-
ple universally demand it and industry will decline from a high
efficiency standard if concentration and cooperation are ignored.
Obsolete laws must be modified and new legislation enacted to
control and regulate. The doctrines of political economists must
be ignored because conditions are running counter to all history.
fn this century combinations international in scope have by the
immense preponderance of power distorted the operation of all
general economic laws. Some kind of legislation is necessary to
correct evil in the development of monopoly which the State can-
not reach until the monopoly has arrived at maturity and caused
no end of distress. Such legislation should be a method of
restraint designed to crimp the symptoms of malevolence. Specific
statutes are needed as initial safeguards to restrain over-capitalized
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concerns exercising the power of a holding company from entering
or continuing in the field of interstate commerce. Whatever is done
affecting this great aggregation of capital should be only after
great deliberation and nothing should be done hastily. The
landmarks of our Government and the principles of government
should be closely observed in this prospective legislation affecting
so great a subject. Freedom and equality are the prime purposes
of our Government, and whatever legislation is pending should
have these principles foremost in mind and be directed to that end.
Some comment is aimed at the proposed bill, which contains a
fundamental fault manifest throughout that it strikes at the size of
industrial corporations; that it preserves the chief fault of the
Sherman Law, which is the policy of a belated attack after the
monopoly has reached the stage of maturity, instead of providing
some means of prevention during development. Neither does
the bill provide for an agency to insist upon the enforcement of
the safeguards. Some think that the element of size is not an
integral of danger, but it seems that a corporation or monopoly
can reach such large dimensions of business as to make its man-
agement impossible. That the size is inconsequential to a viru-
lent monopoly is disputed. Certainly it seems manifest that the
size is dangerous and uncontrollable by reason of its stupendous
physical character and enormity of business. So staggering has
become the New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad that the
Federal Government has instituted suit for its dissolution into in-
tegral parts now controlled, which may be released from the
present management to be placed under direct and efficient man-
agement. The size of this blooded monopoly is the evil which
may be fully disclosed by the investigation of this railroad and its
inside associations with the Canadian Grand Trunk. The ques-
tion in industrial regulation is greater than the simple destiny of
the United States Steel Corporation, and much more far-reaching
than a simple acknowledgment or criticism of its bad faults. That
the solution of the question of the regulation of industrial corpora-
tions is a most difficult task, can not be denied. The legislators de-
fining the Government's attitude toward industrial corporations
must be certain which policy will insure respect for its authority
and create and maintain stability in legitimate business. Such
statutes should provide for supervision of all issues of securities,
and prohibit one corporation from holding stock in another, and
limit the extent to which two or more corporations may have
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common directorates. For the purpose of amassing capital, in-
dividuals are taking advantage of the liberal incorporation laws
of the various States and have combined these corporations into
vast aggregations to control wealth through interlocking direc-
torate management. A single individual can not monopolize nor
control the industries of this country unless he obtains a monopoly
by special privilege. In this age enormous wealth is a necessary
element for the development of industries, and such enormous
wealth can only be massed by a combination of corporations who
have no natural rights, being creatures of the Government. No
great amount of good can result to the people by permitting a few
privileged corporations to control all the industries. What is
needed is strict Government regulation of industrial wealth, which
makes a nation great by affording opportunities for every one
who possesses a reasonable capital and ability to embark safely
in some industry.
Thus, after reviewing the evils of special privilege and being
fully convinced that some kind of governmental regulation is
necessary to cure the damages caused by the ill-used unlimited
power authorized by States, we are of the opinion that a Federal
Incorporation Law would be in order for large corporations.
That the Sherman Act needs no revision, or strengthening, for
the dissolution of the blooded trusts, but we recommend that the
Federal Courts shall have exclusive powers in enforcing the Sher-
man Anti-trust provisions, to insure the thoroughness and com-
pleteness of their destruction. In view of the probable fact that
the solution of the trust evils can not be obtained otherwise than by
new legislation, some bills should be outlined to prohibit the inter-
locking of directorates, except when approved by an administra-
tive industrial commission; and prohibit persons engaged in the
manufacture and sale of railroad material and rolling stock, or in
the mining and sale of coal, from becoming directors or other
officers of railroads engaged in interstate commerce.
That holding companies should be forbidden except when
licensed for temporary purposes of organization by an adminis-
trative industrial commission.
That all corporations, or combinations of some certain fixed
valuation, should be compelled to acquire a United States charter
before engaging in interstate commerce.
That all corporations, when they obtain a Federal charter, shall
be required to reincorporate at an amount not to exceed the actual
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value of their assets. In arriving at the valuation of assets noth-
ing shall be received for a "monopoly" value, or value merely for
their exclusive or substantial control of the industry in whichl
the corporation is engaged.
That incorporations interested in the arbitrary employment of
members of industrial associations, as the American Federation
pf Labor and its subsidiaries, should be controlled by an adminis-
trative industrial commission.
That a company, firm, or corporation, or officer thereof, doing
a manufacturing business, directly or indirectly, should be pro-
hibited to own in whole, or in part, directly or indirectly, by stock
ownership, or otherwise, any railroad or Qther transportation
lines, or property of any common carrier.
That individuals, or a State, should have the opportunity to
intervene in a Government suit, and access to the Courts, and the
benefit of adequate and sufficient remedies for any wrongs suffered.
J. Newton Baker.
District pf Columbia Bar.
